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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
C. G. EKLUND, doing business under the 
name of: 
C. G. EKLUND ELECTRIC COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
and 
H. B. EMPEY, 
Interpleaded Plaintiff, 
- vs -
CLINTON L. ELWELL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
STATEMENT BY RESPONDENT 
No. 7256 
This is an action which involves the question of an undis-
closed principal, and arose out of the facts as set forth in 
appellant's "Statement of the Case" and the further facts as set 
out herein together with some controverted matters which 
respondent hereby attempts to correct and clarify. 
The only questions for determination in this case were 
aptly stated by counsel for defendant and appellant as follows: 
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"The only question is as to who is entitled to be paid and 
what amount and whether it was installed in a workmanlike 
manner" (Bill Qf Exceptions, Page 16.) Now as to corrections 
and clarification, it appears that respondent owns and operates 
a store at Ogden, Utah, from which he sells electrical merchan-
dise and equipment. (Bill of Exceptions Page 12.) That at-
tached to respondent's complaint and made a part of the same 
and marked "Exhibit A" he set forth an itemized statement of 
every article of merchandise or equipment sold by him, and 
put in the building of the appellant, together with the price 
of each article. (See Exhibit "A" attached to the complaint-
Bill of Exceptions, Page 002.) That respondent also set forth 
a·n itemized statement of each hour of labor of each man, who 
did any work on appellant's building and the date he did said 
work. (Exhibit "B" attached to the complaint-Bill of Excep-
tions, Page 003). That the established scale of wage~ for an 
electrician at Ogden, Utah, during said time of ip.stalling said 
equipment was $2.2~ per hour, and for an apprentice $1.25 per 
hour; that these were reasonable and the going prices therefor, 
(Bill of Exceptions, Page 18.) and that the price for the said 
electrical equipment was likewise reasonable therefor. (Bill of 
Exceptions, Page 15). That the total sums amounted to $1499.05. 
That defendant and appellant presented no evidence in opposi-
tion to these figures, so it must be assumed these amounts are 
reasonable and correct. That respondent controverts the alleged 
facts appearing on bottom of page 2 of appellant's brief which 
says,-"that plaintiff, so far as defendant knew, claimed no 
interest in the contract until long after Empey discontinued 
work at the job." (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 007 and 017). How-
ever the facts are much to the contrary, for in November, 1946 
(long prior to the completion of the job) the appellant and 
respondent and Empey talked over the telephone, and respon-
dent asked appellant for some money and appellant said, "the 
finance company would pay it if we signed a release". (Bill of 
Exceptions, Pages 29 and 30). No question then in appellant's 
mind who he owed. Again, the same parties, except Empey, had 
a conversation at the Bank and appellant said, "Will you send 
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me a statement of labor and material because 1 have got track 
of every hour on the job and the material." (Bill of Exceptions, 
Page 26). No question then in mind of appellant who he owed, 
either. The trial court also found that the appellant knew that 
respondent was the real party in interest in November, 1946, 
(Bill of Exceptions, Page 030) also see (Bill of Exceptions, Page 
21); and further respondent controverts paragraph 2 from top 
of page 4 of appellant's brief, in this, the court found that 
Empey owed defendant $137.23 and allowed an offset of this 
amount against the amount of the judgment awarded to plain-
tiff, in the sum of $1499.05 thereby reducing the amount of the 
judgment plaintiff had ·recovered against defendant from 
$1499.05 to $1361.82. The fact is, there was n.o offset against 
Empey, as he was awarded no judgment. (Bill of Exceptions, 
Page 031). Further, respondent controverts paragraph 4 from 
top of page 4 of appellant's brief wherein he states that "plain-
tiff did not go out to the job, (appellant's brief, Page 4.) 
"whereas, the fact is plaintiff did go there several times. (Bill 
of Exceptions, Page 22). 
It is further stated by appellant that the plaintiff and res-
pondent never did talk to the defendant, until after the job was 
just about completed, or after it was completed, and that he 
never did submit a statement to defendant neither before, at 
the time of, or after completion of the work. (Appellant's Brief, 
Page 5). Again this is not the fact and is misleading. The cor~_ 
rect statement is that in November, 1946, several months be-
fore completion of the job, the plaintiff and the interpleaded 
plaintiff, Empey, discussed the job with the defendant, and re-
quested him to pay some money; (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 29 
and 30) and further, the plaintiff did submit, a statement to 
the defendant on this job at defendant's request (Bill of Ex-
ceptions, Page 26) and the bill was submitted in the name of 
Empey Electric Company, and the reason it was submitted in 
the name of Empey Electric Company was because the defen-
dant requested that it be written that way. (Bill of Exceptions, 
Page 28 and 29). The defendant complains that the plaintiff. 
kept no records of this job, except, as they were handed to him 
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by Empey. The fact is, that Empey was plaintiff's foreman and 
had charge of all work done on the job (Bill of Exceptions, 
Page 15 and 37 and 38), and handed in his time to the plaintiff 
as any other foreman would do, and the plaintiff paid the bills. 
(Bill of Exceptions, Page 13 and 15). The appellant complains 
that the plaintiff did not finish the job on the Elwell property, 
but that the Murphy Niel Elecvic Company was called in to do 
part of the work to be done by Empey. (Appellant's Brief, Page 
u). This statement is misleading, in that, it fails to state the 
reason that the work was not completed by the plaintiff or 
Empey; the fact is, that the defendant Elwell "told us not to go 
back and finish it any more," and the job was not completed 
by Empey or plaintiff, neither was Elwell charged by the plain-
tiff or Empey, with the work done by the Murphy Neil Electric 
Company, consequently, he suffered no damage thereby. (Bill 
of Exceptions, Page 39 and 62.). 
CROSS ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS 
Comes now the respondent and hereby makes and assigns 
the following errors, for the purpose of obtaining a modifica-
tion of a portion of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law and also, of the Amended judgment herein, to-
wit: 
1. That the court erred in making and entering its Find-
ings of Fact, being a part of paragraph No. 5 of the Amended 
Findings of Fact, in this, that it allowed defendant an offset in 
the amount of $137.23 against the plaintiff, thereby leaving a 
balance due the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of 
$1361.82, instead of the amount of $1499.05. (Bill of Exceptions, 
Page 030). 
2. That the court erred in making and entering its Con-
clusions of Law being 'that part of said paragraph of the 
Amended Conclusion's qf Law, in this, that it entitled plaintiff 
to a judgment against defendant in the sum of $1361.82 instead 
of the amount of $1499.05. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 030).' 
3. That the court erred in making and entering its judg-
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ment, being paragraph No.4 of the Amended judgment, in this, 
that it decreed that the defendant offset the sum of $137.23 
against the amount found due the plaintiff of $1499.05, thereby 
reducing the amount the plaintiff could recover against the de-
fendant to the sum of $1361.82 (Bill of Exceptions, Page 031). 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S CROSS 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
Discussing respondent's cross assignments numbered 1, 2, 
and 3, respondent will consider them together as they revolve 
about essentially the same point, that is, the trial court found 
that the Interpleaded Plaint.iff Empey was indebted to defendant 
in the sum of $137.23, and that defendant was entitled to an 
offset in this amount against the plaintiff which reduced plain-
tiff's judgment from $1499.05 to $1361.82 and respondent con-
tends that this reduction should not have been allowed for the 
reason that all parties were before the court and because that 
said indebtedness occurred long prior to the instant transaction 
and that a judgment against the interpleaded plaintiff Empey, 
in favor of defendant would have been proper in the premises 
instead of deducting this obligation from the amount awarded 
the plaintiff. If the interpleaded plaintiff had not been before 
the court, then, perhaps this offset would have be'en justified, 
but as all three parties were heard, this defendant should have 
no greater claim or right against the plaintiff, than he would 
have had against the interpleaded plaintiff, if the suit were 
between the defendant and· the interpleaded plaintiff. There-
fore, the court should have awarded a judgment in plaintiff's 
favor against defendant for $1499.05 and awarded a judgment 
in defendant's favor against the interpleaded plaintiff in the 
amount of $137.23. No citations, I feel, need be given in up-
holding this contention. 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
The appellant's first assignment claims the trial court erred 
in overruling his demurrer wherein he alleged that the com-
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plaint of plaintiff did not state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action, and, in support thereof, claims the allegations 
are not statements of fact but are conclusions-"that labor 
and materials were furnished in the name of Empey Electric 
Company for plaintiff's benefit"; that a statement was sub-
mitted in the same name, and that it was for "plaintiff's use 
and benefit"-and that the Empey Co. claims no right or in-
terest in the sum owing and that appellant does not know wheth-
er the said Empey Company is "an individual or partnership or 
otherwise". If these are conclusions, they have been upheld by 
the courts as proper allegations. To plead by using the common 
counts in this state has been done so frequently, and sustained 
so often, as a proper method of pleading, that it seems odd to 
have it challen_ged now. However, I quote the following in 
support of the same: 
"Where a contract has been fully performed and noth-
ing remains to be done but to pay the money, the plaintiff 
may elect either to declare specifically or upon the common 
counts." 4 American Jurisprudence 498; 3 California Juris-
prudence 384; 2 Ban crofts Code Pleading, Page 1302; Wil-
lett & Burr Alpert 185 Pac 976; Castagino V. Ball etta 23 Pac 
127; Maynes V. Galliano 205 Pac 950; Wilcox V. Newman 
190 Pac 138; 129 Pac 356 (Utah). According to the great 
weight of authority the common counts in assumpsit may 
be used in stating a cause of action under the codes. 2 Ban-
crofts Code Pleading, Page 1357, 1358; 4 American Juris-
prudence 522 ;_see 114 Pac. 143 (State vs. District Court of 
Boxelder County). 
If the pleading was uncertain or unintelligible, then the 
proper procedure for appellant was to have filed a special demur-
rer, and ask for clarification of these matters. He did not do this, 
hence, he will be precluded now from raising the question. It 
has been held many times, demurrant is deemed to have waived 
this objection if he fails to raise it in proper time (Child vs. 
Gillis Construction Company 129 Pac. 356). This case says: 
"under such circumstances, the objection, not having been 
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taken by special demurrer, must in this jurisdiction be deemed 
as waived." (See also 114 Pac. 143). 
However, in spite of appellant's objections to respondent's 
complaint, he shows conclusively, in his Amended Answer, that 
he understood all the said objections, as he sets up the answer to 
each one and even states that Empey was an individual doing 
business under the name of Empey Electric Company. From all 
the issues in the case, joined by the complaint, the amended 
answer and the replies, and not from plaintiff's complaint alone, 
did the trial court hear the evidence and apply the law, the 
appellant was not surprised or prejudiced in any manner, as a 
·reading of his amended answer will definitely show. And, in 
addition, all three interested parties were before the court and 
each testified in his own behalf. The interpleaded plaintiff, 
Empey, was brought into court on an order of appellant and he 
should not now complain when he brought all parties concerned 
before the court. 
The appellant also contends that plaintiff's complaint is 
defective in its allegations in respect to "undisclosed principal· 
and agent and otherwise." Our Supreme Court has set out the 
allegations necessary to support a complaint on the above 
theory, and it has been followed in the case now before the 
court: (Child vs. Gillis Construction Company 129 Pac. 356.) The 
cases cited by appellant are not in point. Our own court has 
decided what is required in this .state and it is still the law. (See 
Child vs. Gillis Construction Company above). I shall not argue 
the matter further in respect to the necessary allegations or 
the law governing undisclosed principal in our jurisdiction, as 
the Child vs. Gillis Construction Company case above seems to 
have settled that. 
In appellant's assignment No. 2 he claims evidence was 
admitted improperly by the trial court, in showing that Empey 
was a foreman for respondent on the defendant's job. In view 
of all the facts in evidence, this contention can hardly be sus-
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tamed. Elwell, in his amended answer, refers to Empey having 
supervision and control of all the work; and together with two 
other men, did all the work mentioned in the complaint, and 
that he brought all the equipment to Elwell's place and installed 
it. Now, if this was not enough to show that Empey acted as 
plaintiff's foreman on defendant's job and also other jobs, I call 
the court's attention to this testimony: (Mr. Empey was testify-
ing) 
Q What were your duties as an employee of Eklund 
Electric Company? 
A Oh, I laid out the jobs and developed some of them. 
also put material on the job; rounded up material that 
was hard to get. Kept the jobs agoing. 
Q Who did you report to in respect to these matters? 
A Mr. Eklund. 
Q From whom did you take your orders? 
A From Mr. Eklund. 
Q And who paid you? 
A Mr. Eklund. 
Q And who supplied you with the material you needed 
on these jobs? 
A Eklund Electric. 
Q Mr. Empey, I hand you Plaintiff's purported Ex-
hibit A, and ask you to tell me what that is? 
A That is a weekly time report. 
Q And who prepared that report? 
A I did my self. 
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Q That is in your own hand-writing? 
A That is right. 
Q And does that have the hours that were put on 
the job at the Elwell property? 
A That is right. It has the hours there and also other 
hours. 
Q In other words, at that time you had a number of 
jobs? 
A That is right. 
Q That you were supervising? 
A That is right. 
Q Under the Eklund Electric? 
A That is right. 
Q And this sheet you say was made once each week? 
A Yes 
Q I notice on this sheet at the top there is one column 
to the left without any name. Who does that refer to? 
A That goes to Munford. 
Q There is one in the middle without a name? 
A That is mine. 
Q At the left side there is a column marked "Helper." 
Who is that? 
A That is Mr. Shaw. 
Q Does that go all the way through that way? 
A That is right. That is in rotation, and goes in every 
week. 
Q You tabulate the hours put in each week? 
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A Yes, sir. 
Q At the end of the week each person gets paid for 
what he did during that week? 
A That is right. Gets paid on Monday morning. 
Q Is this sheet correct as to the number of hours? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q To whom do you hand this when it is prepared? 
A Mr. Eklund. 
Q And on these sheets I notice in different places it 
says, "Gas Station, 8th and Washington." Is that the Elwell 
property? 
A That is what it meant. (See Bill of Exceptions, 
Pages 37 and 38). 
The evidence shows, without any contradiction, that Eklund 
paid for ali labor and all material that went into Elwell's build-
ings. As stated before, if there was any controversy between 
Eklund and Empey as to who was entitled to the money, there 
might be a point to Elwell's assignment, but, as there is none 
whatsoever, this question is largely academic. 
It is further contended by the appellant, that the complaint 
does not allege that either party hereto was licensed to do the 
work. This question was never raised by the defendant in his 
demurrer, amended answer, order or reply. In fact, counsel 
st~ted in open court at the trial, "The only question is as to 
who is entitled to be paid and what amount and whether it was 
installed in a workmanlike manner", and, taking counsel at his 
word, the case was tried on just those issues. Now that the deci-
sion was adverse, he seeks to raise a different issue. During the 
trial, the evidence showed (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 19 and 31) 
that Empey had worked for Eklund for several years and Ek-
lund had always taken out the licenses; that during 1946, Empey 
10 
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took out these licenses, as agent for Eklund, as Eklund was 
working at a government depot near Ogden, Utah; that Empey 
was a licensed contractor, and that all the work done on de-
fendant's property was done under the guidance, control and 
supervision of Empey, a licensed contractor. (Defendant's 
amended answer, paragraph 3 thereof; Bill of Exceptions, page 
017 and also appellant's brief on page 4; and Bill of Exceptions, 
Pages 20 and 31). What more could Elwell ask on any job? 
The statute 79 - SA - 1 Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which 
appellant relies on is primarily to protect the public against 
would be contractors who are not qualified by training or ex-
perience to do competent contracting work. But, in the instant 
case all the work was supervised and done under the direction 
of Empey, who was a qualified, licensed contractor, so in reality 
the defendant was protected as the law intended him to be. The 
United States Supreme Court has this to say regarding this 
very section : 
"Neither this nor any other section of the Utah statutes 
provides in express language that a contract employing an 
unlicensed contractor to perform services, falling within 
the field of his trade, shall be unenforceable". (Dow vs. 
United States. lS4 F 2nd 707, 710, construing above sec-
tion 79 - SA - 1). 
The cases cited by appellant are not in point as they do not 
relate to facts as they arise in this case, and counsel has very 
candidly said, "We have found no case directly in point under 
our statutes" (Appellant's Brief, Page 1S). 
As to the salient points in this case, aside from supercritical 
objections, we have the following: There is no dispute that 
Empey and two other men performed labor for Elwell at his 
request, and that certain electrical equipment was put into 
Elwell's buildings; there is no dispute and no evidence to the 
contrary, that Eklund furnished and paid for all material as 
well, and that he paid for all labor performed there; also, there 
was no evidence given by Elwell to controvert that the reason-
11 
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able going wage for an electrician was $2.25 per hour and for 
an apprentice $1.25 per hour; neither did Elwell offer any 
evidence to dispute the testimony of Eklund and Empey that 
the items of mat~rial set forth in plaintiff's Exhibit "A", at-
tached to complaint, were not installed in his buildings, nor 
that the hours of labor set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" were 
not actually performed on Elwell's property. This being the 
situation, the only important question in this case is, who should 
Elwell pay? He says, in effect, I did not contract with Eklund, 
therefore, I will not pay him, but I do owe Empey, and I want 
to pay him. At the trial, Elwell gave some evidence that Empey 
owed him $497.81 due from diverse transactions, and requested 
that these be offset against the amount he owed Empey. The 
trial court found these items were not owed by Empey except 
$137.23 and then did offset this amount against the judgment 
the court awarded to Eklund, so, in effect, Elwell obtained the 
same result he had asked for, except, the judgment creditor was 
called Eklund instead of Empey. Had the court awarded the 
judgment to Empey against Elwell, the amount of the judgment 
would have been identical. And, in further proof of this, Elwell 
in the prayer of his amended answer, sums up the case this way: 
"That this Honorable Court fix and determine the rea-
sonable value of the work and labor accomplished and the 
materials and equipment furnished this defendant by the 
said H. B. Empey; that this defendant be given credit upon 
said sum for the sum of $497.81 due and owing this defen-
dant from the said H. B. Empey and that Empey be given 
judgment for the balance." 
The trial court actually followed the procedure suggested 
by Elwell, but in so doing, found a different amount due Elwell 
from Empey, and found the balance owing after the full offset 
due to Eklund, instead of Empey and yet, in no way has in-
creased the burden on Elwell, but has left it just the same, as if 
the judgment had been· awarded Empey.· 
Elwell might have some point on his contention, if Eklund 
and Empey both claimed the money, ~ut the fact is, Empey does 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1..: 
not claim any part of it. It is alleged by Eklund that he is the 
owner and holder of the claim. Empey testified under oath that 
Eklund had paid him and the men for all labor they had put on 
Elwell's buildings, and for all material; and that he claimed 
nothing against Elwell, and that the money, owing for th~ job, 
was due to Eklund. Certainly, und
1
er this state of facts, Elwell 
would have no legal excuse for not paying Eklund and in so 
doing, would settle the matter in full between all parties con-
·cerned. 
Appellant's assignment No. 3 states that the trial court 
erred in refusing to grant a non-suit against the plaintiff. The 
court did not err. Elwell has already referred to this same point 
before, and urged tha-t the agreement was made between him-
self and Empey, and that no matter what happened after that, 
Empey would be the only person he would have to deal with, 
and that he never knew of Eklund in the transaction. Yet it 
appears, from the evidence, that Elwell "hollered" to Eklund 
as he came out of a bank and told him, "to get that statement 
to me right away if you expect to get your money and 'the state-
ment better be right". Why did Elwell say this, if he did not 
know that Empey was employed by Eklund? Or, that he did 
not know Eklund was the real party concerned in the deal? The 
fact is, that Elwell knew Eklund was furnishin_g all the material 
and all labor or the above conversation would be meaningless. 
Elwell employed Empey on a time and material basis and there-
after it was discovered (giving Elwell the benefit of everything) 
that Eklund was the undisclosed principal. As a common sense 
matter, what difference would it make whether Eklund sued as 
an undisclosed principal and recovered, or if Empey sued as a 
trustee for his principal and recovered? As a fact, you have 
the principal and agent appearing in this case, as plaintiffs 
anyway. Somebody furnished labor and material in the work 
done on Elwell's buildings, and paid for it, and Elwell is now 
being asked to pay. All parties were before the court, and the 
court decided the amount due, decided the set-off due Elwell, 
deducted it from the sum owing to Eklund, and ordered a judg-
ment be entered for the balaqce. Both Eklund and Empey agree 
13 
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that th ebalance owing belongs to Eklund; that Empey has been 
fully paid ~or his labor by Eklund and that Eklund furnished all 
material. How could there be error in the refusal of the trial 
court to grant the nonsuit against the plaintiff? 
Assignment No.4 of Appellant's brief asks for a reversal of 
this decision, for the reason, that the evidence submitted by 
plaintiff was insufficiently competent to support the Amended 
findings of Fact. This same question has been submitted to 
this same court many times. I believe the answer given is usually 
the same . .If there is any competent evidence to support the 
Findings of the trial court, in a law case, this court will not 
disturb those findings. (Appellant's cases cited so held.) There 
may be evidence on both sides of each issue, but it is the duty 
of the trial court, to determine where the preponderance or 
weight of the evidence lays. In this case the trial court has done 
that, but, notwithstanding, appellant wants this court to try. the 
issues again in this appeal. The trial court has found allegations 
of Elwell's amended answer untrue, and not supported by the 
preponderence of the evidence, except, as to one item for 
$137.23, and the court allowed this to be deducted from the 
amoupt found due the plaintiff, and, instead of awarding a 
judgment for $1499.05, it reduced this amount in Elwell's favor 
to the sum of $1361.82. Certainly, even a casual reading of the 
evidence in this matter will disclose, that Eklund has supported 
each finding with competent evidence and that the trial court 
made_ no error in its findings. 
The appellant further contends, that the Conclusions of 
Law and rendering judgment in favor of respondent and 
against appellant, is also an error, and then proceeds to say 
that the court should have dismissed the case as against the 
plaintiff and left all the matters to be determined then between 
Empey and Elwell, and in so doing, the court would have found 
a judgment in favor of Empey in a sum of not to exceed $524.47. 
But the point appellant has forgotten, is this, that all the evi-
dence Elwell had against Empey has been already presented in 
this action, and that Empey was present and that Empey testi-
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;;;(i 
fied in this case; that both parties have had their day in court, 
to the same extent as if Eklund had been excluded, and they 
had carried on as between themselves. What greater rights could 
appellant ask for than he has already received? All the evidence 
he had, he has given to the court. What more could our law give 
him? Appellant then contends by saying that a judgment should 
have been found in favor of Empey and against Elwell, or if 
not, then in favor of Eklund as an undisclosed principal, and 
against Elwell, but not to exceed $524.47. On this question of 
amount, the court found all of Elwell's items not proper charges 
against Empey, except one, and so denied the balance. The trial 
court found Eklund the real party in interest and awarded him 
a judgment for $1361.82. There was no evidence given by El-
well to dispute the material put into his dwellings, or the rea-
sonable value thereof. Therefore, the court's findings on this 
allegation must be assumed true. Neither was any evidence 
given by Elwell to dispute the labor costs, and likewise, they 
must be assumed to be correct. This being the case, Elwell owes 
some one $1499.05 less $137.23, the offset the trial court allowed 
him. It seems to respondent, the only big question raised in this 
case by Elwell is to whom does he owe this money? He says he 
wants to pay it. The evidence shows Eklund furnished all labor 
and material. Empey says, ''I have been paid by Eklund and I 
do not claim any of this sum". It is due to Eklund. In view of 
these facts, what difference does it make to Elwell who he 'pays, 
when all parties concerned are before the court, and the court 
has found Elwell owes one and not the other. In dollars and 
cents it is the same no matter which gets paid. 
In conclusion respondent contends that he is the real party 
in interest. 
·te That competent evidence has beer:t given in support of his 
:;: allegations. 
That the appellant has not been prejudiced in any way. 
That the offset of $137.23 deducted from the amount 
awarded to him should have been a judgment against Empey, 
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and should not have been charged against his amount of judg-
ment, and that respondent is entitled to a judgment against 
Elwell in the sum of $1499.05. 
The only matter for determination in this case is well stated 
by counsel for appellant as follows: "The only question is as 
to who is entitled to be paid and what amount and whether it 
was installed in a workmanlike manner". (Bill of Exceptions, 
Page 16.) 
This being the case then, who is entitled to the money, Ek-
lund or Empey? 
The judgment of the district court in the above entitled 
action should therefore, be affirmed, with the above modifica-
tion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
P. LEROY NELSON 
Attorney for respondent. 
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